Active learning and optimal climate policy by Hwang, In Chang et al.
Active learning and optimal climate policy
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Hwang, In Chang, Hofkes, Marjan W and Tol, Richard (2018) Active learning and optimal climate 
policy. Environmental and Resource Economics. ISSN 0924-6460 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/79803/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
1 
 
Active learning and optimal climate policy 
Abstract 
This paper develops a climate-economy model with uncertainty, irreversibility, and active learning. 
Whereas previous papers assume learning from one observation per period, or experiment with control 
variables to gain additional information, this paper considers active learning from investment in monitoring, 
specifically in improved observations of the global mean temperature. We find that the decision maker 
invests a significant amount of money in climate research, far more than the current level, in order to 
increase the rate of learning about climate change. This helps the decision maker make improved decisions. 
The level of uncertainty decreases more rapidly in the active learning model than in the passive learning 
model with only temperature observations. As the uncertainty about climate change is smaller, active 
learning reduces the optimal carbon tax. The greater the risk, the larger is the effect of learning. The method 
proposed here is applicable to any dynamic control problem where the quality of monitoring is a choice 
variable, for instance, the precision at which we observe GDP, unemployment, or the quality of education. 
Key words 
Climate policy; irreversibility; uncertainty; learning; active learning 
JEL Classification 
Q54; O3; C63 
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1 Introduction 
It has long been known that expectations on future information affect current decisions. This is typically 
specified as passive learning, where the decision maker updates information about state variables as model 
time progresses. In some cases, it might be optimal to learn by experimenting with control variables. In this 
paper, we consider active learning, i.e., investment in improved monitoring, as an alternative route to 
increase information, and investigate the implications for climate policy. 
There is considerable uncertainty about all aspects of climate change and climate policy. As the 
consequences of emission abatement decisions are irreversible or at least long-lived, the prospect of future 
learning, materially affects optimal climate policy in the short-run. The previous literature assumes that 
new knowledge either arrives exogenously or arrives without cost in the form of new observations about 
the climate system.1 However, learning requires investment and can be decelerated or accelerated by 
monitoring and research. In this paper, we explore simultaneous decisions about learning and abatement. 
Uncertainty becomes smaller as the decision maker observes the system. As the state of the system, and 
thus the information it contains, depends on past decisions, the planner controls, to a certain extent, what is 
learned. However, in the literature (e.g., Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Kelly and Tan, 2015; Hwang et al., 2017), 
learning is a by-product of decisions on the carbon tax. In such a representation, there are two state variables 
(e.g., the carbon stock and the stock of knowledge) but only one control variable (the carbon tax). Decisions 
                                                          
1 Manne and Richels (1992), Peck and Teisberg (1993), Kolstad (1996a, b), Nordhaus and Popp (1997), Ulph and 
Ulph (1997), Gollier et al. (2000), and Webster (2002) incorporate exogenous learning. In these studies, information 
arrives exogenously at some points in time, and thus learning is independent of actions of the decision maker. Kelly 
and Kolstad (1999), Leach (2007), Webster et al. (2008), Cai et al., (2012), Jensen and Traeger (2013), Lemoine and 
Traeger (2014), Kelly and Tan (2015), Fitzpatrik and Kelly (2015), Rudik (2016), and Hwang et al. (2017) construct 
endogenous learning models. The cost of learning is not explicitly considered in their papers, and learning happens as 
new instances of state variables are realized. Karp and Zhang (2006), Van Wijnbergen and Willem (2015) investigate 
the effect of such passive learning with theoretical models. 
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are therefore second best optimal (Tinbergen, 1954). We introduce a second control variable (i.e. research 
investment) in order to control learning separately from emissions. 
In a seminal paper, Prescott (1972) shows that there is a tradeoff between control and information when 
there is uncertainty about the effect of a policy instrument. He finds it is optimal to sacrifice part of the 
current benefits of control in order to obtain information that improves future decisions – we refer to this 
as (learning by) experimentation. Especially when uncertainty is large or when the time horizon is long, 
experimentation becomes more important (MacRae, 1972; Kendrick, 1982).2 Later developments include 
multiple uncertainties (e.g., Wieland, 2000a), time-varying parameters (e.g., Beck and Wieland, 2002), 
alternative utility functions (e.g., Johnson, 2007), and correlated information (e.g., Marcoul and Weninger, 
2008).3 
In the Bayesian learning literature the decision maker has a prior belief on an uncertain parameter and 
she updates her belief with new information using Bayes’ Rule. If the decision maker has no control over 
the precision of the new information or the rate at which it arrives, we refer to this as passive learning. For 
instance, Kelly and Kolstad (1999), Leach (2007), Kelly and Tan (2015), and Hwang et al. (2017) 
investigate the impact of passive learning about the climate system on optimal greenhouse gas emission 
control. In their models, learning is a by-product of control. 
This paper differs from the literature. First and foremost, one of the control variables is used exclusively 
to increase the speed of learning – we refer to this as active learning. Specifically, we manipulate the 
precision of new observations, or the sharpness of the likelihood function in Bayes’ Rule. In previous papers, 
learning occurs as time progresses (passive learning) or learning is a by-product of control (learning by 
                                                          
2 In the literature, experimentation has been mainly investigated for monetary policy (e.g., Kendrick, 1982; Bertocchi 
and Spagat, 1993; Wieland 2000b; Beck and Wieland, 2002; Yetman, 2003).  
3 See Bar-Shalom and Tse (1976), Kendrick (1982; 2005) for non-Bayesian approaches.  
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experimentation). Because learning is a control variable, we have to take the cost of learning into account. 
Most other papers do not consider the cost of learning explicitly.4 The gains from learning are improved 
decisions, whereas the costs of learning are losses. By balancing the gains and losses, the rate of learning 
is determined, together with the optimal control rate for emissions.  
The implementation of active learning in a climate economy model is worthwhile since public as well as 
private funders subsidize research activities to learn about climate processes. The rate of learning depends 
on such efforts. For instance, WMO and UNEP (2010) estimate that global annual expenditures on climate 
observations are about $4~6 billion. As a result, observational errors on temperatures have substantially 
decreased (Kennedy et al. 2011). In addition, our approach highlights the channel of learning. We cannot 
experiment with the climate system. For climate sensitivity, defined as the equilibrium global warming in 
response to a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, we get only one observation a 
year (Knutti et al., 2002) from a natural, uncontrolled experiment. Considering the fact that the quality of 
the data can be improved when the observation is based on a more accurate measurement, our channel of 
learning (i.e., improving the quality of monitoring) is a useful way to increase the speed of learning, despite 
the limitations of the data.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and methods. The revised DICE model 
(Nordhaus, 2008) is used in this paper. Main revisions include the introduction of a fat-tailed distribution 
of climate sensitivity and the implementation of active learning about the climate sensitivity. Main results 
and sensitivity analyses are given in Section 3. Section 4 provides conclusions.  
                                                          
4 Strictly speaking, the cost of learning is implicit in their papers in that experimentation with higher carbon emissions 
may lead to higher damages in the future. The magnitude of this effect has not been formally investigated yet.  
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2 The model and methods 
2.1 The revised DICE model 
We revise the well-known DICE model (Nordhaus, 2008) to introduce uncertainty and learning about 
climate change. Here we focus only on the main revisions. For the full model see Appendix A. Unless 
otherwise noted, initial values for the state variables and parameter values follow Nordhaus (2008). The 
decision maker in our model chooses the rate of emissions control and the level of research investment for 
each time period so as to maximize social welfare defined as in Equation (1). Gross output, net of damage 
costs and abatement costs, is allocated to consumption, research investment, and gross investment (other 
than climate research) as in Equation (2).  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜇𝑡,𝑅𝑡
𝔼 ∑ 𝐿𝑡𝛽
𝑡 𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0
 (1) 
𝐶𝑡 = (1 − 𝜃1µ𝑡
𝜃2) 𝛺𝑡𝑄𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡  (2) 
 
where 𝔼 is the expectation operator, 𝑈 is the utility function, 𝐶 is consumption, 𝐿 is labor force, µ is the 
rate of emissions control, 𝐼 is gross investment (other than climate research), 𝛺 is the damage function, 𝑄 
is gross output, 𝑅 is investment in climate research, 𝛽 is the discount factor, 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 are parameters.  
The research capital stock accumulates as follows: 
𝐾𝑅,𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿𝑅)𝐾𝑅,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 (3) 
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where 𝐾𝑅 is the research capital stock, 𝛿𝑅=0.15 is the depreciation rate of the research capital stock (Hall 
et al., 2010).5 
Unlike DICE, we apply annual time steps with an infinite time horizon. In order to consider the effect of 
uncertainty more properly, we set the lower bound of consumption as low as possible and remove the upper 
bound of temperature increases. Reducing the computational burden, the savings rate is assumed to be 
exogenous (𝐼 = 𝑠𝑄).6 As shown in Hwang et al. (2017), this assumption does not materially affect the 
results of DICE and its variants, since the savings rate does not change much for many plausible model 
specifications. In addition, backstop technology is not considered in the model. With backstop technology 
climate risk (e.g., catastrophic consumption loss) can be more easily eliminated by setting emissions to be 
zero at a finite cost. 7 
                                                          
5 δR=0.15 is generally assumed in the literature, although some recent studies find that δR is higher than 0.15 (Nadiri 
and Prucha, 1996; Hall et al., 2010; Li and Hall, 2016; Cristini et al., 2016). We find that the parameter value does not 
affect the main results of this paper from some sensitivity analyses (results not shown). The general finding is that 
research investment stabilizes at a low level, which varies according to δR, so as to compensate for the depreciated 
research capital stock. 
6 The computational method of this paper is based on Hwang (2017). The method obtains solutions from optimality 
conditions, and therefore we need to derive optimal policy rules from the first order conditions. This becomes a 
problem when a model has many control and state variables. Since our model has several nonlinear functions with 3 
control variables and 10 endogenous state variables, deriving optimal policy rules is not an easy task. In addition, 
endogenous savings rate increases the computational burden. For a passive learning model of Hwang et al. (2017), 
even a single run (with a maximum tolerance level of 1e-4) was not solved within an hour (with a system of 2.5GHz 
Intel Core i7, 16GB 1600MHz DDR3), which means it would take several weeks for 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations. 
Regarding the constant savings rate, Hwang (2017) compares the results of the two versions of the DICE model (one 
with a constant savings rate, another with a flexible savings rate) and finds that there is no significant difference in the 
results between the two versions. One of the reasons is that the optimal savings rate of the DICE model does not 
change much over time and it gradually approaches a constant value as the economy approaches the equilibrium. For 
further discussions and accuracy tests see Hwang (2017). We defer the application of a flexible savings rate to future 
research.  
7 As Hwang et al. (2013; 2016) show, the application of fat-tailed distribution of the climate sensitivity with CRRA 
utility function into the DICE model (as in our model) may lead to a catastrophic consumption loss. It would be 
optimal for the decision maker to reduce carbon emissions totally (i.e. zero emission) if a backstop technology is 
available with a finite cost. This is an implication of the Dismal Theorem (Weitzman, 2009). The backstop technology 
in the original DICE model comes at a finite cost. 
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The temperature response model of the DICE model is:  
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 = 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+𝜉1{𝑅𝐹𝑡+1 − (𝜂 𝜆⁄ )𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡 − 𝜉3(𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡 )}
 
 (4) 
𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡+1 = 𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡 + 𝜉4{𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡}
 
 (5) 
 
where  𝑇𝐴𝑇 and  𝑇𝐿𝑂 are atmospheric and oceanic temperature changes, respectively, from 1900, 𝑅𝐹𝑡+1 =
𝜂 ln (𝑀𝐴𝑇,𝑡/𝑀𝑏) ln (2)⁄ + 𝑅𝐹𝑁,𝑡 is radiative forcing, 𝑀𝐴𝑇 is the carbon stock in the atmosphere, 𝑀𝑏 is the 
pre-industrial carbon stock in the atmosphere,  𝑅𝐹𝑁,𝑡 is radiative forcing from other than greenhouse gas, 𝜆 
is the equilibrium climate sensitivity, 𝜂, 𝜉1, 𝜉3, and 𝜉4 are parameters.  
This paper follows the tradition of Bayesian statistical decision theory which requires that uncertainty or 
partial ignorance can be represented as a probability distribution (DeGroot, 1970). We apply the framework 
of feedback analysis (Hansen et al., 1984) in order to introduce a fat-tailed climate sensitivity distribution.8 
Risk is fat-tailed if the probability density of an uncertain variable falls more slowly than exponentially in 
the tail (Weitzman, 2009). The probability distribution of the climate sensitivity is derived from the 
distribution of the total feedback factors (Roe and Baker, 2007), as 
𝜆 = 𝜆0 (1 − 𝑓)⁄  (6) 
 
                                                          
8 The framework of feedback analysis is useful in the following reasons: 1) the total feedback factors are observable, 
unlike the climate sensitivity; 2) it is easy to apply the Bayes’ Theorem since the total feedback factors are usually 
assumed to be normally distributed (Roe and Baker, 2007); 3) the resulting climate sensitivity distribution has fat tails. 
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where 𝑓 is the total feedback factors, which is assumed to be strictly less than 1, and 𝜆0 is the equilibrium 
climate sensitivity in a black body planet without any feedbacks.9 The total feedback factors denote the 
aggregate impacts of physical factors such as water vapor, cloud, and albedo on radiative forcing in a way 
to magnifying the response of the climate system (Stocker et al., 2013). 
Substituting Equation (6) for 𝜆  in Equation (4), replacing radiative forcing with its components, 
rearranging, and introducing natural variability (stochastic shocks) result in:  
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 = (𝜁1𝑓+𝜁2)𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡 + 𝜁3ln (𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑡/𝑀𝑏) + 𝜁4𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡 + 𝜉1𝑅𝐹𝑁,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑛𝑣   (7) 
 
where 𝜀𝑛𝑣 is natural variability normally distributed with mean zero (Brohan et al., 2006), 𝜁𝑖 (i=1,2,3,4) are 
adjusted parameters (𝜁1 = 𝜉1𝜂/𝜆0, 𝜁2 = 1 − 𝜁1 − 𝜁4, 𝜁3 = 𝜉1𝜂/ln (2), and 𝜁4 = 𝜉1𝜉3).  
Observed atmospheric temperature is governed by the following equation.  
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑜𝑏𝑠  (8) 
 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠  is the observed temperature change, 𝜀𝑜𝑏𝑠  is observational errors normally distributed with 
mean zero including measurement errors and data coverage bias (Webster et al., 2008).  
Notice that the climate system is not affected by observed temperature but by actual temperature. Actual 
temperature is not known to the decision maker and thus is not used for learning. Observed temperature 
affects the decision maker’s belief on the climate sensitivity, resulting in the choice for the rate of emissions 
                                                          
9 𝑓 should be strictly bounded above on a physical science basis. We know that 𝜆 is not defined for 𝑓=1 from Equation 
6 and the climate system cannot be reached an equilibrium if 𝑓>1 (Baker and Roe, 2009). 
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control (or carbon tax). The climate system is indirectly affected by observed temperature in this way. We 
simulate both actual temperature and observed temperature and apply each for its own purpose: actual 
temperature for the climate system and observed temperature for the learning process.10  
2.2 Implementation of active learning 
The literature on decision making under uncertainty and learning about the climate sensitivity assumes that 
knowledge grows by one observation per year with constant precision (or observational error) (e.g., Kelly 
and Kolstad, 1999; Leach, 2007; Webster et al., 2008; Kelly and Tan, 2015; Hwang et al., 2017). Instead, 
this paper considers additional learning through improved monitoring, retaining annual observations. 
Research investment in the global climate observational system increases the precision not so much of 
individual temperature observations, but rather in the estimate of the global mean temperature. This in turn 
lowers estimation errors for the climate sensitivity (see Equation 12 below). As the standard error in the 
mean of temperature increases (decreases), the signal to noise ratio falls (grows), making it more difficult 
(easier) to detect the true state of the world. 
                                                          
10 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 is a function of 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡 and observational errors, which is changing according to the level of research capital (see 
Equations 8, 11). Actual temperature is determined by the law of physics and natural variability, which do not change 
over time. Although actual temperature is not known to the decision maker, it affects future temperature as in Equation 
(7). The probability of high temperature increases at a certain point in time should be the same for both the passive 
learning model and the active learning model, if the choices of the decision maker are the same. But since the belief 
of the decision maker on the state of the world is different, her choices become different between the passive learning 
model and the active learning model. The change in expectation leads to the different decisions on the stringency of 
climate policy. If uncertainty is large (or fat-tailed), learning induces large changes in the choices of the decision 
maker.  
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As the global climate observational system improves, the standard error in the mean of temperature falls. 
For instance, as illustrated in Figure 1, the variance of global mean temperature has decreased over time as 
the number of weather stations has increased.11 
[Figure 1] 
From Equation (8), the standard error in the mean of observed temperature is decomposed into two 
elements as follows. We assume that the variance of natural variability is constant over time since natural 
variability is not controllable by the decision maker. In addition, we assume that natural variability and 
observational errors are independent. 
𝜎𝜀,𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑜𝑏𝑠,𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2  (9) 
 
where 𝜎𝜀, 𝜎𝑜𝑏, and 𝜎𝑛𝑣 are the standard error in the mean of observed temperature, observational errors, 
and natural variability, respectively. 
  Broadly speaking, observational errors are linearly related to the reciprocal of the number of observational 
instruments (Jones et al., 1997; Brohan et al., 2006), at least in the relevant domain (see Figure 1).12 
Assuming independence between sea surface temperature (SST) observational errors and land air 
temperature (LAT) observational errors, the total observational errors of global mean temperature can be 
                                                          
11 The quality of observations as well as the number of observations is important for the standard error in the mean of 
temperature. For instance, increasing the number of observational system does not necessarily improve the precision 
of the measurement of climate change if the quality of observations is limited. However, for simplicity we refer the 
consideration of the quality of observations to future researches.   
12 The other non-linear relationships between uncertainty and research investment would be interesting to study, which 
is referred to future research.    
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calculated as follows. For simplicity, we assume that observational errors approach zero as investment in 
the global temperature observational system becomes arbitrarily large. 
𝜎𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑙𝜎𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑙,𝑡
2 + 𝜔𝑠𝜎𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑠,𝑡
2 = ∑ 𝜔𝑗 (𝛼𝑗 𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑗,𝑡⁄ )
𝑗
 (10) 
 
where 𝑗 ∈ {𝑙, 𝑠} refers to each observation (𝑙 for LAT and s for SST), 𝜔 is the respective area of the land or 
the sea (𝜔𝑠 + 𝜔𝑙 = 1), 𝑁𝑜𝑖 is the number of observational instruments, 𝛼𝑗 is a parameter.  
Equation (10) leads to Equation (11), the channel through which research investment affects the 
uncertainty about temperature shocks. 
𝜎𝜀,𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑙 𝑐𝑙𝛼𝑙 (𝑝𝐾𝑅𝑡)⁄ + 𝜔𝑆𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 {(1 − 𝑝)𝐾𝑅𝑡}⁄ + 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2 = 𝑎𝑅 𝐾𝑅𝑡⁄ + 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2  (11) 
 
where 𝐾𝑅 is the research capital stock for the global temperature observational system,  0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1 is the 
proportion of money spent on land observations, 𝑐𝑙 ≡ 𝑝𝐾𝑅/𝑁0,𝑙 and 𝑐𝑠 ≡ (1 − 𝑝)𝐾𝑅/𝑁0,𝑠 are the unit cost 
of LAT and SST observation, respectively, and 𝑎𝑅 ≡ 𝜔𝑙 𝑐𝑙𝛼𝑙 𝑝⁄ + 𝜔𝑆𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 (1 − 𝑝)⁄ .  
The decision maker updates her beliefs on the total feedback factors using Bayes’ Rule as follows (Cyert 
and DeGroot, 1974; Lemoine, 2010): 
𝑝(𝑓|𝑇𝐴𝑇
𝑜𝑏𝑠) ∝ 𝑝(𝑇𝐴𝑇
𝑜𝑏𝑠|𝑓) × 𝑝(𝑓) (12) 
 
where 𝑝(𝑓)  is the prior distribution, 𝑝(𝑇𝐴𝑇
𝑜𝑏𝑠|𝑓)  is the likelihood function (the likelihood of 𝑇𝐴𝑇
𝑜𝑏𝑠 
observation given 𝑓), and 𝑝(𝑓|𝑇𝐴𝑇
𝑜𝑏𝑠) is the posterior distribution. Since the temperature shocks are assumed 
12 
 
to be normally distributed with mean zero, more precise temperature observations lead to an improved 
decision on carbon tax.  
The normal distribution of the total feedback factors with parameters 𝑓?̅? and 𝜎𝑓,𝑡 is used as the initial 
prior for the year 2005 (Roe and Baker, 2007). The resulting posterior mean and the posterior variance of 
the total feedback factors are:  
𝑓𝑡+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝑓?̅? + 𝜁1𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝐻𝑡+1 𝑣𝑡 𝑣𝜀,𝑡⁄
1 + (𝜁1𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠)
2
𝑣𝑡 𝑣𝜀,𝑡⁄
 (13) 
𝑣𝑡+1 =
𝑣𝑡
1 + (𝜁1𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠)
2
𝑣𝑡 𝑣𝜀,𝑡⁄
 (14) 
 
where 𝑓?̅?  and 𝑣𝑡 = 𝜎𝑓,𝑡
2  are the mean and the variance of the total feedback factors, 𝑣𝜀,𝑡 = 𝜎𝜀,𝑡
2  is the 
variance of temperature shocks, and 𝐻𝑡+1 ≡ 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝜁2𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝜁3 ln(𝑀𝑡 𝑀𝑏⁄ ) − 𝜁4𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡 − 𝜁5𝑅𝐹𝑁,𝑡.  
The posterior distribution with parameters 𝑓𝑡+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and 𝑣𝑡+1 of Equations (13) and (14) serves as the prior 
for the next time period. In this way the decision maker learns about the true value of the total feedback 
factors for each time period. Note that the parameters of the posterior distribution are affected by research 
investment through Equations (11) and (14) and the parameters become endogenous state variables. The 
higher research investment, the lower is the variance of the total feedback factors. From Equation (6) the 
probability distribution of the climate sensitivity can be derived from the probability distribution of the total 
feedback factors.  
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2.3 Calibration 
In order to calibrate 𝑎𝑅 and 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2  in Equation (11) we use global expenditures on temperature observations. 
We take a bottom-up approach. Global mean LAT is calculated from the records of each country’s weather 
stations and global mean SST is calculated from the reports of observational platforms such as ships, 
drifting buoys, and moored buoys (Kennedy et al., 2011). With this in mind, we multiply the number of 
each observational platform and the unit cost of each instrument (see Table 1). Annual operational costs for 
temperature observational instruments are estimated to be about $450 million in 2005. 13  The total 
installation costs for all the existing instruments are about $500 million.14 Second, 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2  is calculated as the 
difference between the total variance of temperature shocks (=0.102) estimated by Tol and De Vos (1998) 
and the variance of observational errors (=0.062) obtained from the HadCRUT4 dataset (Morice et al., 2012). 
Then we can postulate that the research capital stock (𝐾𝑅0 = $950 million) results in the variance of 
temperature shocks (𝜎𝜀,0
2 =0.102) (Equation 11). So, 𝑎𝑅=$3.42 million.
15  
[Table 1] 
                                                          
13 For comparison, the United States spent $140 million on in-situ climate observations in 2010 (submission of USA 
to UNFCCC/SBI 35). WMO and UNEP (2010) estimate that annual global expenditure on climate observations is 
about $4~6 billion. Douglas-Westwood (2006) estimates that the total costs of ocean observations are $402 million in 
2005. Their estimates are not directly comparable to this paper, however, because their estimates include all kinds of 
observations besides temperature, such as precipitation, wind, ice, as well as satellite observations.  
14 This number is fairly small compared to the world economy. The initial value for the global capital stock (in 2005) 
is $137 trillion in the original DICE model. Thus the research investment in climate observations has a negligible 
effect on the growth path of the world economy. In this case, cost-benefit analysis rather than a complex dynamic 
stochastic model can be used to calculate the optimal research investment. Nevertheless, our model is useful for the 
investigation of the effect of learning on optimal policy simultaneously with research investment. In addition, the 
literature on learning about climate change generally applies dynamic stochastic learning models (e.g., Kelly and 
Kolstad, 1999; Kelly and Tan, 2015).   
15 We do not separate the operational costs and the installation costs for these calibrations, for simplicity. That is, we 
assume that the research capital stock is the sum of the operational costs and the installation costs. An alternative is to 
explicitly represent operational costs in the model, but this does not affect the main results of this paper (results not 
shown). 
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As shown in Figure 2, our parameterization implies that the variance of temperature shocks decreases 
(increases) as the research capital stock increases (decreases). If there is no change in the research capital 
stock, the variance of observational errors (in turn, the variance of temperature shocks) remains the same. 
16  
[Figure 2] 
We set the level of satisfaction of the decision maker about the level of learning, mainly for computational 
reasons. This assumption also reflects the point that the decision maker does not want not make an effort 
to reduce the variance of observational errors if she thinks there has been enough learning. We can think of 
this as a budget constraint. This puts an upper bound on the research investment (in turn, on the research 
capital stock).17 More specifically, we set 𝑅𝑡=0 if 𝜎𝜀,𝑡
2 − 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2 < 𝜔𝑐, where 𝜔𝑐 reflects the level of satisfaction 
of the decision maker on the level of learning. According to our parameterization (𝜎𝑛𝑣
2 =0.064, 𝜔𝑐=10
-6), if 
the variance of the temperature shocks 𝜎𝜀,𝑡
2  (always higher than 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2 , by assumption) becomes close to (but 
never equals to) the variance of natural variability 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2  through research investment, say 
0.064<𝜎𝜀,𝑡
2 <0.064001 (less than 0.002 percent higher than 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2 =0.064), the decision maker does not invest 
money for learning.  
This upper bound is binding after a certain year. For instance, when we set 𝜔𝑐=10
-6, the upper bound of 
the research investment is binding after 2045. The problem is that the solution time increases a lot if there 
is no such an upper bound. For instance, a single run without the upper bound takes more than 30 minutes. 
                                                          
16 Our calibration may overestimate the benefit of the research investment because temperature observations are not 
just used for learning about the climate sensitivity, but also for other various activities including weather forecast, 
agriculture, and transportation (AATSE, 2006). For the decomposition of the cost of temperature observations 
according to the sector of use, we refer to future research. 
17 From Equations (3) and (11) this assumption serves as an upper bound of research investment (𝑅𝑡 ≤ 𝑎𝑅 𝜔𝑐⁄ −
(1 − 𝛿𝑅)𝐾𝑅,𝑡). For instance, with 𝜔𝑐=10
-6 and the above parameterizations (i.e., 𝑎𝑅=$3.42 million, 𝐾𝑅,0=$950 million, 
𝛿𝑅=0.15), the upper bound of the initial research investment is about $3.42 trillion.  
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With the upper bound, however, 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations take about 6 hours. The results between 
the two cases are a bit different as shown in Figure B.3 (Appendix B).  
2.4 Computational methods 
In order to solve our large model, we apply the computational method of Hwang (2017), who refines the 
earlier work by Maliar and Maliar (2005) and Judd et al. (2011). 18 The problem is reformulated in a 
recursive way as: 
𝑊(𝒔𝑡 , 𝜽𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝒄𝒕
[𝑈(𝒔𝑡 , 𝒄𝑡 , 𝜽𝑡) + 𝛽𝔼𝑡𝑊(𝒔𝑡+1, 𝜽𝑡+1)] (15) 
𝑊(𝒔𝑡 , 𝜽𝑡) ≈ ∑ 𝜓(𝒔𝑡 , 𝜽𝑡; 𝒃𝒏)
𝑁
𝑛=1
 (16) 
 
where 𝑊 is the value function starting from period 𝑡, 𝒄 is the vector of control variables (𝜇, 𝑅), 𝒔 is the 
vector of state variables (𝐾, 𝐾𝑅, 𝑀𝐴𝑇, 𝑀𝑈, 𝑀𝐿, 𝑇𝐴𝑇
𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑇𝐿𝑂, 𝑓,̅ 𝑣, L, A, σ), 𝑀𝑈 and 𝑀𝐿 are the carbon stocks 
in the upper ocean and the lower ocean, respectively, σ is the emissions-output ratio, 𝜽 is the vector of 
uncertain variables (f, 𝜀), 𝜓 is the basis function, and 𝒃 is the vector of coefficients for the basis function. 
The solution algorithm is summarized as follows. First, approximate the value function with a flexible 
basis function. Second, derive the first order conditions for optimal policy rules. Third, choose an initial 
guess on the coefficients 𝒃 of the basis function: 𝒃(0). Fourth, simulate a time series of variables satisfying 
                                                          
18 Hwang (2017) takes advantage of the fact that the first order conditions of DICE result in global solutions (Solak et 
al., 2015). One of the advantages of the simulation-based method of Hwang (2017) is that it reduces the computational 
burden compared to the grid-based methods in the literature because it searches for solutions on a set satisfying the 
first order conditions. See Hwang (2017) for more discussions on the solution method.  
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the first order conditions, transitional equations, and boundary conditions with the initial guess 𝒃(0). 19 Fifth, 
calculate the left hand side and the right hand side of the Equation (15) using the simulated time series, and 
then find 𝒃 that minimizes the difference between them: ?̂?. 20 Sixth, update the initial guess 𝒃(0) using a 
pre-specified updating rule: 𝒃(1). Seventh, iterate the above process with the new guess 𝒃(1) until the value 
function converges. 21  
Accounting for random realizations of the uncertain variables, the model is run 1,000 Monte Carlo 
simulations and the average of all simulations is presented. For additional results, see Appendix B. The true 
value of the total feedback factors is set at 0.6 (which corresponds to the equilibrium climate sensitivity 
3°C/2xCO2, the most likely value according to the current scientific knowledge) (Stocker et al., 2013) for 
the reference case. The other true values are considered in Section 3.4.  
For simulations, the initial values for 𝑓?̅? and 𝑣𝑡 are assumed to be 0.65 and 0.13
2, respectively, following 
the current scientific knowledge (Roe and Baker, 2007). The models are also simulated with different initial 
beliefs but the general implications of these simulations do not change (results not shown). Since the total 
feedback factors are bounded above, the posterior distribution is derived first with the conjugate normal 
                                                          
19 The simulation length is set at 1,000 years. Longer horizons do not affect the main results of this paper. 
20 The Gauss-Hermite integration is applied for the expectation in Equation (15) with 10 integration nodes. Higher 
number of nodes does not affect the main results of this paper.  
21 The maximum tolerance level is set at 1.0×10-4, which is small relative to net present welfare. Existing numerical 
models generally apply a similar tolerance level (e.g., Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Cai et al., 2012; Lemoine and Traeger, 
2014). The more stringent tolerance level gains a bit more accuracy at the expense of the speed of convergence. 
Actually, changing the tolerance level from 1.0×10-4 to 1.0×10-5 does not change our results significantly. When the 
stopping criterion holds, the relative difference of two consecutive policy functions (i.e., 
max[|{𝜇𝑡
(𝑝+1)
− 𝜇𝑡
(𝑝)
} 𝜇𝑡
(𝑝)
⁄ |, |{𝑅𝑡
(𝑝+1)
− 𝑅𝑡
(𝑝)
} 𝑅𝑡
(𝑝)
⁄ |], where p refers to the pth iteration) is 6.2×10-4. An alternative is 
to compare two consecutive policy functions for stopping criterion (i.e., 
max[|{𝜇𝑡
(𝑝+1)
− 𝜇𝑡
(𝑝)
} 𝜇𝑡
(𝑝)
⁄ |, |{𝑅𝑡
(𝑝+1)
− 𝑅𝑡
(𝑝)
} 𝑅𝑡
(𝑝)
⁄ |] ≤ 𝜔, where ω is the maximum tolerance level) and compare the 
relative difference of value functions. We find that this does not affect our main results. If the relative difference of 
two consecutive policy functions was set at 1.0×10-3 for the tolerance level, we get the same optimal solutions and 
the relative difference of two consecutive value functions is 1.0×10-4. For more error analyses see Appendix C.  
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prior, and then an upper bound (𝑓?̅? ≤0.999) is set for simulations following Hwang et al. (2017). The upper 
bound corresponds to the climate sensitivity of 1,200°C/2xCO2, which is far higher than any admitted 
values. Note that the most likely value for the equilibrium climate sensitivity is 3°C/2xCO2 (Stocker et al., 
2013). Hwang et al. (2017) find that higher upper bounds than this do not affect the main results. Since the 
atmospheric CO2 concentration is expected to be doubled around 2100, roughly speaking, the climate 
sensitivity is a proxy for temperature increases around 2100.  
3 Results 
3.1 The rate of learning 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the climate sensitivity distribution. For comparison, the results of the model 
with passive learning are also presented. As expected, the mean parameter 𝑓 ̅converges to the pre-specified 
true value and the variance parameter 𝑣 approaches – but never reaches – zero over time. The rate of 
learning, measured as the reduction in the (simulated) coefficient of variation of the climate sensitivity 
(Webster et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2017), is higher under active learning than under learning only from 
temperature observations. It takes 44 years for the coefficient of variation to be reduced by 50% for 
improved observations, whereas it takes 57 years in the passive learning model. For comparison, the 
learning time for 50% reduction in the coefficient of variation of the climate sensitivity is about 60~70 
years in Webster et al. (2008) when the prior similar to the current paper is used (see Figure 10 of their 
paper).22 This is because by construction, learning in this paper constitutes an additional way to produce 
information.  
                                                          
22 The rates of learning in Kelly and Kolstad (1999), Leach (2007), and Kelly and Tan (2015) are not directly 
comparable to the current paper since they define learning differently from ours: learning takes place in their models 
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[Figure 3] 
Table 2 shows the corresponding probability of high temperature increases. The probability density in 
the upper tail of the climate sensitivity distribution shrinks faster for active learning than for passive learning. 
Therefore the probability of high temperature increases is lower in the active learning model than in the 
passive learning model. For instance, the probability of temperature increases higher than 6°C in 2105 for 
active learning is more than 5 times lower than the one for passive learning case. This is the reason why 
there is a substantial need for research investment, and the reason why there is a difference in carbon tax 
between the active learning case and the passive learning case (Section 3.3). 
[Table 2] 
3.2 Research investment 
The optimal level of investment in climate research is much higher than the current level. For instance, the 
initial level of investment in the global climate observational system is about $1.2 trillion.23 These are the 
reasons. First, the benefit of learning is far greater than the cost of learning (Keller et al., 2007a, b; Baehr 
et al., 2008). For comparison, with a discrete uncertainty representation and exogenous learning, Peck and 
Teisberg (1993) estimate that the value of information on the climate sensitivity is $148 billion, and 
Nordhaus and Popp (1997) estimate that the value of information on the climate sensitivity is $6.9 ~ 11.7 
                                                          
when the mean of the uncertain variable becomes statistically close (e.g., at a significance level of 0.05) to the pre-
specified true value. 
23 We conduct sensitivity analyses on the level of satisfaction of the decision maker on learning (𝜔𝑐). If the decision 
maker wants less precise observations (see Section 2.3), the amount of money spent on the global observational system 
should be decreased. For instance, if the decision maker sets a criterion that 𝜔𝑐=10
-5 (10-4, respectively), instead of 10-
6 in the reference case, the level of investment is $341 billion ($34 billion, resp.). For those cases, however, the 
boundary condition (or the budget constraint) binds from the first period. 
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billion.24 Keller et al. (2007b) estimate that the value of information on the climate sensitivity is about $10 
billion.25 Keller et al. (2007a) estimate that the value of information associated with early detection of 
changes in the North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (MOC) is in the order of tens of billions 
of dollars, which is far higher than the cost of MOC observation systems (tens of millions of dollars, see 
Baehr et al., 2007). Baker and Solak (2010) estimate that the optimal level of investment in energy 
technology is on the order of tens of billions of dollars.26 Since the current paper deals with the fat-tailed 
distribution of the climate sensitivity it is not surprising that the benefit of learning is greater in our model 
than in the literature (Weitzman, 2009). 
Second, the research investment is small compared to the world economy. It is less than 1% of the global 
capital stock (see footnote 14). Of course, no one country would agree to pay the cost but we are concerned 
with a global model. In addition, the total cost of climate change (damage cost + abatement cost) can be 
largely reduced (see Figure 4) when we account for (active) learning because the decision maker can rule 
out, to some extent, the possibility of tail events (extreme temperature increases) from learning, and thus 
she spends less money for emissions control. For instance, the net present value of the avoided cost (the 
total cost of the uncertainty case minus the total cost of the active learning case) for the next two centuries 
                                                          
24 Peck and Teisberg (1993) introduce 3 states of the world: 1, 3, and 5°C/2xCO2. The value of information in their 
model is calculated as the difference in (monetized) expected utility between instant learning and no-learning. If 
learning in 40 years is considered, the value of information is $24 billion. Nordhaus and Popp (1997) consider 5 
discrete climate sensitivities: mean, ±1 standard deviation, and ±2 standard deviation. The value of information in 
their model is calculated as the difference in (monetized) expected utility between instant learning and learning in 50 
years. 
25 They consider 3 climate sensitivities. They also find that if there is a temperature limit of 2.5°C the value of learning 
about the climate sensitivity is $800 billion.  
26 AATSE (2006) and Cristini et al. (2016) find that the benefit of ocean observations is far larger than the cost of 
observations, although they do not account for learning about the climate sensitivity. 
20 
 
is about $ 9.2 trillion (applying the discount rate of DICE), which is 2.1% higher than the net present value 
of the total research investment during the next two centuries.27 
Third, we model R&D as an unrestricted flow. Future research should consider capacity and expansion 
limits on R&D.  
After the large initial investment, as shown in Figure 4, the research investment decreases sharply. The 
research investment from the second year is largely due to the depreciation of the research capital stock.28 
The research capital stock reaches an upper bound around 2045, implying that the decision maker satisfies 
with the level of learning after 2045, and thus does not spend money for improved observations (see Section 
2.3) except the compensation for the depreciated research capital stock. This reflects the point that early 
investment to reduce uncertainty is more beneficial because (1) it benefits a longer future and (2) knowledge 
saturates in our model specifications. Note that research investment is here mostly in equipment rather than 
specialist personnel, so that a rapid scaling-up and –down is feasible. These results imply that the optimal 
decision is to make uncertainty as low as possible since the cost of learning is much lower than the benefit 
of learning. Figure 4 also shows some sensitivity analyses on the cost of learning. The research capital stock 
increases as the cost of learning increases, as implied by Equation (11).  
[Figure 4] 
                                                          
27 For a more thorough discussion, we need to consider the opportunity cost of research investment and the general 
equilibrium effect. Since our model is not well suited for such an analysis, we refer to future research. 
28  About 90% of the new investment after the initial year is to compensate for the depreciated research capital stock 
(results not shown).  
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3.3 Carbon tax 
It is well known that fat-tailed risk substantially increases the stringency of climate policy. Even in the 
theoretical framework of Weitzman (2009), learning does not matter because the marginal damage cost (or 
willingness to pay for a reduction of carbon emission) becomes arbitrarily large under fat-tailed risk. In this 
case, the fat tail is not thinned by learning. However, as argued in the literature (Costello et al., 2010; 
Millner, 2013; Horowitz and Lange, 2014; Hwang et al., 2013, 2016), in a realistic setting such as bounded 
radiative forcing, the marginal damage cost can be bounded. Kelly and Tan (2015) and Hwang et al. (2017) 
apply this framework and find that learning substantially reduces the effect of fat-tailed risk because 
learning is faster in the tail. Policy recommendations such as carbon tax are substantially different from the 
no-learning case. The current paper follows this framework but extends the approach: active learning. The 
optimal carbon tax is calculated as a Pigovian tax (Nordhaus, 2008).29 As expected, the optimal carbon tax 
is highest for the uncertainty model and is lowest for the deterministic model (see Figure 5 and Table 3). 
Active learning substantially reduces the carbon tax because it takes away so much uncertainty.30 
[Figure 5] 
As mentioned in Section 2, there are limits to learning. The variance of natural variability remains fixed 
at 0.082 for the reference case. This serves as the lower bound for the variance of temperature shocks. The 
                                                          
29 The carbon tax is calculated as follows: 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 =  −𝜏 (𝜕𝑊 𝜕𝐸𝑡⁄ ) (𝜕𝑊 𝜕𝐾𝑡⁄ )⁄ , where 𝑊 is social welfare 
defined as the discounted sum of population-weighted utility of consumption over the whole time period (Equation 
1), 𝐸 is carbon emission, 𝐾 is the capital stock, and τ is a constant. In our specification, with a climate sensitivity that 
is known to the analyst but not to the decision maker, social welfare differs with the true value of the climate sensitivity. 
The effect of the marginal change in carbon emission (and also in the capital stock) on social welfare also varies with 
the true value of the climate sensitivity.  
30 Considering the amount of carbon emissions and the use of carbon tax as a reference value for public policy making 
(Nordhaus, 2017), a seemingly small difference in carbon tax rates between the cases in Table 3 is, de facto, a very 
important difference. Annual CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels and cement production are about 9.5 
GtC in 2011 (Stocker et al., 2013). Simply put, one-dollar difference in carbon tax rate ($1/tC) leads to a difference 
of about $10 billion a year. 
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sensitivity of the optimal carbon tax to this lower bound is shown in Figure 6. The optimal carbon tax 
decreases if the lower bound of temperature shocks decreases. The higher the magnitude of learning, the 
lower is the optimal carbon tax.  
[Figure 6] 
Table 3 presents the results when the damage function of Weitzman (2012), a highly reactive damage 
function, is applied.31  
𝛺𝑡 = 1 [1 + 𝜋1𝑇𝐴𝑇,𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑇𝐴𝑇,𝑡
𝜋2 + 𝜋3𝑇𝐴𝑇,𝑡
𝜋4 ]⁄  (17) 
 
where 𝜋1=0, 𝜋2=0.0028388, 𝜋3=0.0000050703, and 𝜋4=6.754. For the DICE damage function, 𝜋1=0, 
𝜋2=0.0028388, and 𝜋3=𝜋4=0.  
The effect of the fat tail on climate policy is substantial when the damage function of Weitzman (2012) 
is applied (see the results of the uncertainty model), but is greatly reduced when learning is introduced. 
Research investment further enhances the effect of learning (compare the cases where the true value of the 
climate sensitivity is 3°C/2xCO2). This signifies the importance of learning, especially when the damage 
function is highly responsive to higher temperature increases. Because we can rule out, to some extent, the 
impact of tail events (say, temperature increases of 4.5°C or more) from learning, the intensity of climate 
policy can be largely reduced. The value of research investment is that the decision maker can effectively 
reduce the probability of substantially high temperature increases as shown in Table 2. Thereby active 
learning helps to avoid an unnecessarily large amount of expenditure on emission reductions. Notice that 
                                                          
31 The difference between the two damage functions becomes significant when temperature increases are higher than 
3°C or more (Hwang et al., 2013). 
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the optimal carbon tax is a measure of the intensity of climate policy in this paper.  
 [Table 3] 
3.4 The true value of the climate sensitivity 
In the real world, the true value of the climate sensitivity is not known with certainty. This subsection 
investigates how sensitive our main results to the different true values of the climate sensitivity. Figure 7 
and Table 2 show some results. Roughly speaking, future temperature evolves according to the true value 
of the climate sensitivity (although not known to the decision maker) and the decisions made with regard 
to the states resulting from the current decisions (e.g., emissions control rate, research investment). Other 
things being equal, future temperature will be higher if the true value of the climate sensitivity is higher as 
shown in Figure 7. We also observe that the higher the true value of the climate sensitivity, the fatter is the 
right tail of the climate sensitivity distribution. Since the decision maker considers future damages for the 
current decisions (Bellman’s principle of optimality) (Bellman and Dreyfus, 1962), the rate of emissions 
control or the optimal carbon tax should be higher (lower, respectively) for the higher (lower, resp.) true 
value cases.  
[Figure 7] 
Table 3 and Figure 8 show the cases where the true value of the climate sensitivity (𝜆) is different from 
the initial guess. The initial belief on 𝜆 is the same as the reference case. Other things being equal, as 
expected, the optimal carbon tax is higher if the true 𝜆 is higher. The optimal carbon tax for the active 
learning model is lower than the one for the passive learning model, as in the reference case. Applying the 
damage function of Weitzman, the effect of active learning becomes more prominent. 32  
                                                          
32 These results may be sensitive to the model specifications including the probability distribution, the true value of 
the climate sensitivity, damage function, preference parameters, etc. Further analysis is deferred to future research. 
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[Figure 8] 
4 Conclusions 
We define active learning as investment in knowledge acquisition. Active learning is contrasted to passive 
learning where new information arrives without cost at a fixed rate and precision. We investigate the effect 
of active learning on greenhouse gas emission reduction, noting that climate policy is typified by (deep) 
uncertainty and irreversibility. The decision maker chooses to reduce uncertainty through significant 
investment in climate research, more than three orders of magnitude greater than the current level of 
expenditure. This helps the social planner make better decisions on climate policy. The level of uncertainty 
decreases more rapidly with active learning than with passive learning. As a result, the optimal carbon tax 
is lower for active learning than for passive learning, which in turn is lower than the carbon tax without 
learning. The effect of learning is more pronounced as the tail risk increases. Earlier investment in climate 
research is more beneficial than later investment. 
This paper is the first to introduce active learning into an integrated assessment model of climate and the 
economy. Applying alternative ways of learning would help to understand the role of learning further 
including reconstructions of past temperature which would increase the number of observations in the 
likelihood, and investment in climate research which would sharpen the prior.  
This paper applies the solution method demonstrated in Hwang (2017). His method allows us to solve 
multiple iterations of the model with many state variables quickly for the Monte Carlo analysis. Hwang 
(2017) suggests that this should come at little cost of model accuracy. If it does reduce accuracy, the likely 
impacts on the results are higher savings rates as implied by Hwang (2017). However, this issue is minor 
in our model because we apply a constant savings rate. As shown by Hwang (2017), the difference of the 
results obtained from the two solution methods is minimal when a constant savings rate is applied. Even if 
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that were the case, our paper demonstrates new methodology that can be applied to richer models as 
computer resources improve. 
Active learning apart, this paper closely follows Nordhaus’ DICE model. Other specifications should be 
explored, including alternative utility functions (e.g., Sterner and Persson, 2008), different mitigation cost 
and climate impact functions, and other economic growth models. Perhaps more importantly, we here posit 
a true value of the climate sensitivity, rather than a probability density function, which exaggerates the 
effects of learning. We only consider one uncertain parameter, which suppresses both the effect of 
uncertainty and the cost of learning. We study the case of a global planner. Kolstad and Ulph (2008; 2011) 
show that uncertainty enhances cooperation. This would imply that active learning fosters free-riding. All 
these matters are deferred to future research. 
Active learning by improved monitoring also applies to other areas of public policy. Learning by 
experimentation with policy variables is informative for issues with a short characteristic life time – 
monetary policy, for instance – but less so for issues that span long periods – besides climate change, 
pensions, education and structural unemployment come to mind. The method proposed here applies to any 
area in which knowledge of the response to policy is imperfect partly due to imperfect monitoring. Although 
not always acknowledged, most economic quantities are observed imperfectly or imprecisely, including 
population size, quality of education, occupation, prices, international trade and income. The importance 
of active learning through improved monitoring is therefore probably not limited to climate policy. 
Acknowledgments  
Appendix A: The full model  
The list of variables and parameters are given in Tables A.1 and A.2.  
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max
𝜇𝑡,𝑅𝑡
𝔼 ∑ 𝐿𝑡𝛽
𝑡 𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0
 (A.1) 
𝐶𝑡 = (1 − 𝜃1µ𝑡
𝜃2) 𝛺𝑡𝑄𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡  (A.2) 
𝐾𝑅,𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿𝑅)𝐾𝑅,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 (A.3) 
𝐾𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿𝑘)𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 (A.4) 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜇𝑡)𝜎𝑡𝑄𝑡 + 𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝛿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑈𝐴𝑀𝑈𝑡   
  (A.5) 
𝑀𝑈𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝐴𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑈𝑡   
  (A.6) 
𝑀𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝑈𝐿𝑀𝑈𝑡 + 𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝐿𝑡  
  (A.7) 
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 = 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+𝜉1{𝜂 ln (𝑀𝑡/𝑀𝑏) ln (2)⁄ + 𝑅𝐹𝑁,𝑡 − 𝜂𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡 𝜆⁄ − 𝜉3(𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
− 𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡 )}
 
+ 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑛𝑣  
(A.8) 
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+1
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 (A.9) 
𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡+1 = 𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡 + 𝜉4{𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡}
 
 (A.10) 
𝑓𝑡+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝑓?̅? + 𝜁1𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝐻𝑡+1 𝑣𝑡 𝑣𝜀,𝑡⁄
1 + 𝜁1
2𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠2 𝑣𝑡 𝑣𝜀,𝑡⁄
 (A.11) 
𝑣𝑡+1 =
𝑣𝑡
1 + 𝜁1
2𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠2 𝑣𝑡 𝑣𝜀,𝑡⁄
 (A.12) 
𝑣𝜀,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑅1 𝐾𝑅𝑡⁄ + 𝜎𝑛𝑣
2  (A.13) 
where 𝔼 is the expectation operator given information at point in time 𝑡 (annual). 
[Table A.1], [Table A.2] 
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Appendix B: Additional results 
Figure B.1 is the results for improved observations (the reference case in Section 3). Each figure is the 
average of 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations. This figure shows how each variable evolves over time. For 
instance the rate of emissions control gradually increases during the first 2~3 centuries and then reaches the 
value 1 (full abatement). The carbon stock gradually decreases after the rate of emissions control becomes 
equal to 1. Atmospheric temperature follows the same pattern with a time lag. The maximum temperature 
increases (from 1900) are less than 4°C (in the early 22nd century) for all the cases. There is an initial peak 
in research investment and then the level of research investment becomes trivial. Consumption and gross 
investment (other than research investment) grows continuously since our model is based on the DICE 
model, which represents continuous economic growth.   
[Figure B.1] 
Figure B.2 shows the results of all runs.  
[Figure B.2] 
Figure B.3 shows the research capital stock with and without the upper bound. 
[Figure B.3] 
Appendix C: Error Analysis 
We compare social welfare obtained from our solution method and maximum social welfare obtained from 
grid-based simulations. Since there are 12 state variables, it is not easy to implement simulations using 
Chebyshev nodes for each state variable (e.g., 5 nodes for each state variable lead to more than 244 million 
nodes). Instead, we construct grid points based on control variables. We construct 1001 (equally spaced) 
grid points for the rate of emission control (from 0 to 1) and 51 (equally spaced) grid points for research 
investment (from 0.5 times the optimal level to 1.5 times the optimal level) each time period and calculate 
the corresponding social welfare (51,051 grid points in total each year). Then the maximum social welfare 
is calculated as in Equation C.1. 
𝑊𝑔(𝒔𝑡 , 𝜽𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝒄𝒕,𝒊
[𝑈(𝒔𝑡 , 𝒄𝑡,𝑖, 𝜽𝑡) + 𝛽𝔼𝑡𝑊(𝒔𝑡+1,𝑖, 𝜽𝑡+1)] (C.1) 
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where i refers to grid points, 𝑊g is the value function obtained from grid-based simulations, 𝒄 is the vector 
of control variables, 𝒔 is the vector of state variables, 𝜽 is the vector of uncertain variables.  
The error is defined as the maximum relative difference between the two levels of social welfare obtained 
from our solution method and from grid-based simulations.  
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = max
𝑡
[1 − 𝑊(𝒔𝑡 , 𝜽𝑡) 𝑊𝑔(𝒔𝑡 , 𝜽𝑡)⁄  ] (C.2) 
where 𝑊 is the value function obtained from our solution method (Equation 15). 
The error over the first 100 years is 1.6×10-4. Figure C.1 shows some results. A wider domain may lead 
to different accuracy results, but this is not the case here because control variables are bounded in our 
specification (see Section 2.3). We do not find a wider domain (up to the upper bound of the variables) 
leads to less accuracy.  
[Figure C.1] 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1 Uncertainty about global mean temperature (Left): The variance of global mean land air 
temperature (LAT) 1850-2006 (CRUTEM3, Brohan et al., 2006) as a function of the number of weather 
stations used to estimate the global mean temperature. (Right): The variance of global mean sea surface 
temperature (SST) 1925-2006 (HadSST3, Kennedy et al., 2011) as a function of the number of observations 
used to estimate the global mean temperature. The data were obtained from John Kennedy (personal 
communication). 
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Figure 2 Hypothetical learning dynamics No change refers to the case where the research capita stock 
remains the same as in the initial year. + $X/yr (respectively, - $X/yr) refers to the case where the research 
capital stock increases (resp., decreases) $X every year from the initial level.   
 
 
Figure 3 Climate sensitivity distribution (Top left): The mean of the total feedback factors (Top right): 
The (simulated) coefficient of variation of the climate sensitivity. (Bottom left): The climate sensitivity 
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distribution in 2055 (0~10°C/2xCO2). (Bottom right): The climate sensitivity distribution in 2055 
(10~20°C/2xCO2).  
 
 
Figure 4 Research investment and the total cost of climate change (Top Left): The research investment 
(Top Right): The research capital stock (Bottom): The total cost of climate change (the gross output net 
of consumption, investment, and research investment) for the reference case and the uncertainty case. 
 
Figure 5 The optimal carbon tax  
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Figure 6 Limits to learning and the carbon tax (Left): The evolution of the learning parameters (Right): 
The optimal carbon tax. 
 
  
Figure 7 Sensitivity analysis (the true value of the climate sensitivity) CS refers to the climate sensitivity. 
(Top panels): The climate sensitivity distribution in 2055 (Bottom left): Atmospheric temperature 
(Bottom right): The optimal carbon tax  
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Figure 8 Sensitivity analysis (CS=4.5℃/2xCO2) CS refers to the climate sensitivity (Left): The climate 
sensitivity distribution (the right segment higher than 10℃/2xCO2) (Right): The optimal carbon tax 
 
Figure B.1 Additional results The units for investment, research investment, the carbon stock, temperature 
increases, and consumption are $1,000 per person, trillion dollars, GtC, °C, and $1,000 per person, 
respectively. 
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Figure B.2 Additional results (all simulations) (Top): The mean of the total feedback factors (Upper 
middle): The variance of the total feedback factors (Lower middle): Temperature increases (relative to 
1900) (Bottom): The optimal carbon tax (US$/tC) 
 
Figure B.3 Research capital stock with and without the upper bound Because of the computational 
burden, we present the average of 10 Monte Carlo simulations for the case with the upper bound (see 
Section 2.2). The initial research capital stock ($950 million) is so small that is close to zero in the figure.  
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Figure C.1 Error analysis (Upper) Grid-based simulation results for the initial year. We do not present 
the value of z-axis since value function has a meaningless unit. (Lower) The relative difference of the value 
functions between the dynamic programming method and grid-based simulations for the initial 100 years.  
Tables 
Table 1 Global temperature observational system in 2005 
 Number of instruments / 
observations (thousands) 
Unit cost (1,000US$) 
Installation Operation (per year) 
Low High Low High 
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LAT Weather station 3,455 40 60 
SST 
Number of instruments  
VOS 5,429  4 55 
Drifting Buoy 1,267  4.5 7.8 
Moored Buoy 194 1,150 2,700 200 500 
Number of Observations  
VOS 1,169 
 0.00023 Drifting Buoy 1,632 
Moored Buoy 179 
Sum 2,980   
Note: The number of land weather stations is the one used for building the database CRUTEM4 (Kennedy et al., 2011). 
The number of voluntary observing ships, drifting buoys, and moored buoys are available at 
www.bom.gov.au/jcomm/vos and www.aoml.noaa.gov/phod/dac. The unit cost for land weather station is drawn from 
Mburu (2006). The unit costs for voluntary observing ships, drifting buoys, and moored buoys follow Kent et al. 
(2010), Meldrum et al., (2010), and Detrick et al., (2000), respectively. The unit cost for data transmission using 
satellite communication systems is about $0.23 per observation (North, 2007). The number of SST observations is 
drawn from Kennedy et al. (2011). 
Table 2 The probability of high temperature increase 
 
2055 2105 
Passive learning, 
true 𝜆=3 
Active learning 
Passive learning, 
true 𝜆=3 
Active learning 
true 𝜆=2 true 𝜆=3 true 𝜆=4.5 true 𝜆=2 true 𝜆=3 true 𝜆=4.5 
Prob. of 
𝜆>4.5 
0.158 0.045 0.115 0.215 0.050 3.511E-04 0.019 0.211 
Prob. of 
𝜆>6 
0.053 0.010 0.031 0.068 0.006 1.089E-05 0.001 0.025 
Prob. of 
𝜆>10 
0.009 0.001 0.004 0.010 1.665E-04 6.419E-08 7.766E-06 4.152E-03 
Note: 𝝀 is the equilibrium climate sensitivity (unit: ℃/2xCO2). For all simulations, 𝔼𝟎𝒇=0.65, 𝝈𝒇=0.13. 
Table 3 The optimal carbon tax in 2015 (US$/tC) 
 
Deterministic 
true 𝜆=3 
Uncertainty 
𝑓=̅0.65, 
𝜎𝑓=0.13, 
true 𝜆=3 
Passive learning 
𝔼0𝑓=0.65, 𝜎𝑓=0.13 
Active learning  
𝔼0𝑓=0.65, 𝔼0𝜎𝑓=0.13 
true 𝜆=2 true 𝜆=3 true 𝜆=4.5 true 𝜆=2 true 𝜆=3 true 𝜆=4.5 
DICE damage 
function 
32.0 39.0 31.1 37.6 45.0 29.1 35.5 39.8 
Weitzman’s 
damage 
function 
37.7 201.2 43.9 56.4 215.1 33.9 53.2 99.1 
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Note: 𝝀 is the equilibrium climate sensitivity (unit: ℃/2xCO2). 
Table A.1 Variables 
U Utility function =(𝐶𝑡 𝐿𝑡⁄ )
1−𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)⁄  
𝐶𝑡 Consumption =(1 − 𝜃1µ𝑡
𝜃2) 𝛺𝑡𝑄𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
µ𝑡 Emissions control rate Control variable 
𝑅𝑡 Investment in climate research Control variable 
𝐾𝑡 Capital stock 𝐾0=$137 trillion 
𝐾𝑅,𝑡 Research capital stock 𝐾𝑅,0=$950 million 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑡 Carbon stocks in the atmosphere 𝑀𝐴𝑇0=808.9GtC 
𝑀𝑈𝑡 Carbon stocks in the upper ocean 𝑀𝑈0=18,365GtC 
𝑀𝐿𝑡 Carbon stocks in the lower ocean 𝑀𝐿0=1,255GtC 
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡  Atmospheric temperature deviations 𝑇𝐴𝑇0=0.7307°C 
𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑡 Ocean temperature deviations 𝑇𝐿𝑂0=0.0068°C 
𝑓?̅? Mean of the total feedback factors 𝑓0̅=0.65 
𝑣𝑡 Variance of the total feedback factors 𝑣0=0.13
2 
𝛺𝑡 Damage function =1/(1 + 𝜅1𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡 + 𝜅2𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝜅3 + 𝜅4𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑡
𝜅5 ) 
𝑄𝑡 Gross output =𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛾
𝐿𝑡
1−𝛾
 
𝐼𝑡 Investment in general =𝑠𝑄𝑡𝛺𝑡 
𝐴𝑡 Total factor productivity Exogenous 
𝐿𝑡 Labor force Exogenous 
𝜎𝑡 Emission-output ratio Exogenous 
𝑅𝐹𝑁,𝑡 Radiative forcing from non-CO2 gases Exogenous 
𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑡 GHG emissions from the sources other than energy consumption Exogenous 
𝜀𝑡 Temperature shocks Stochastic 
𝑣𝜀,𝑡 Variance of observed temperature shocks  𝑣𝜀,0=0.1
2 
Note: The initial values for the state variables and the evolutions of the exogenous variables are from Cai et al. (2012), 
except for the research capital stock. The initial research capital stock does not affect the main results of this paper 
unless it is far higher than the default values. The lower bounds of the economic variables such as consumption, the 
capital stock, and gross world output are set to $0.001 per person per year in this paper. In addition, there are no upper 
bounds for temperature increases. 
Table A.2 Parameters 
𝜆 Equilibrium climate sensitivity =𝜆0/(1-𝑓) 
𝑓 True value of the total feedback factors 0.6 
𝜆0  Reference climate sensitivity 1.2°C/2xCO2 
𝑠 Savings rate 0.245 
𝛼 Elasticity of marginal utility 2 
𝜌 Pure rate of time preference 0.015 
𝛽 Discount factor =1/(1+𝜌) 
𝛾 Elasticity of output with respect to capital 0.3 
𝛿𝑘 Depreciation rate of the capital stock 0.1 
𝛿𝑅 Depreciation rate of research investment 0.15 
𝜅1, 𝜅2, 𝜅3, 𝜅4 Damage function parameters 𝜅1=0, 𝜅2=0.0028388, 𝜅3=2, 𝜅4=𝜅5=0 
𝜃1, 𝜃2 Abatement cost function parameters 𝜃1=0.0561, 𝜃2=2.887 
𝛿𝐴𝐴, 𝛿𝑈𝐴, 𝛿𝐴𝑈, 
𝛿𝑈𝑈, 𝛿𝑈𝐿, 𝛿𝐿𝐿, 𝜉1, 
𝜉3, 𝜉4, 𝜂 
Climate parameters 
𝛿𝐴𝐴=0.9810712, 𝛿𝑈𝐴=0.0189288, 
𝛿𝐴𝑈=0.0097213, 𝛿𝑈𝑈=0.005, 𝛿𝑈𝐿=0.0003119, 
𝛿𝐿𝐿=0.9996881, 𝜉1=0.022, 𝜉3=0.3, 𝜉4=0.005, 
𝜂=3.8 
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𝛼𝑅 Learning parameters $3.42 million 
𝜎𝑛𝑣
2  Learning parameters 0.0064 
𝑀𝑏  Pre-industrial carbon stock 596.4GtC 
𝜔𝑐  
Parameter reflecting satisfaction of the decision 
maker with the magnitude of learning 
10−5 
𝑣𝜀,0 
Initial value of the variance of observed 
temperature shocks 
0.102 
Note: The parameter values for climate parameters are from Cai et al. (2012). The parameter values for 𝜆0 and 𝛿𝑅 are 
from Roe and Baker (2007), Hall et al. (2010), respectively. The other parameters are from Nordhaus (1994; 2008) 
except for the learning parameters. 
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